Handwriting Testimony in a Criminal Conviction and the Disbarment of a Lawyer by Stein, Elbridge W.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 39 | Issue 4 Article 13
1949
Handwriting Testimony in a Criminal Conviction
and the Disbarment of a Lawyer
Elbridge W. Stein
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminology is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation




HANDWRITING TESTIMONY IN A CRIMINAL
CONVICTION AND THE DISBARMENT OF A LAWYER
Elbridge W. Stein
Elbridge W. Stein, Examiner of Questioned Documents, New York City, has been
active in this field for upwards of thirty years and has figured in the investigation
and trial of important cases throughout the country. During all his professional prac-
tice he has been interested in the development of scientific methods in the examina-
tion of documents and the proof of facts in court and has done much to promote
these advancements. In this connection he was a moving force in the founding of
the American Society of Questioned Document Examiners which today numbers
among its members the leading handwriting experts of the country. From its forma-
tion he has held office in the Society and is at present its Vice-President. Mr. Stein
has contributed to a number of legal and scientific publications including two previous
papers in this Journal.-EDITOR.
The case of the People of the State of New York vs. Ray-
mond J. Riley is both tragic and unique. It is tragic in that
a young lawyer was unjustly convicted and disbarred. It is
unique in that the conviction was vacated years afterward
mainly because the assistant district attorney who tried the
case failed to call as a witness for the prosecution his hand-
writing expert who had reported to him during the trial that
the complaining witness was not telling the truth about the
genuineness of her signature on an authorization which wa
the main basis of the defense.
It is not unique that the expert on handwriting reported
adversely on the genuineness of the disputed signature because
40% to 60% of the cases investigated by a handwriting expert
result in opinions by him unfavorable to the client who presents
the case. These adverse opinions seldom come to the attention
of the general public, and some persons still believe that a
handwriting expert always gives an opinion favorable' fo the
client who consults him.
Raymond J. Riley was a young practicing attorney in New
York and was engaged by Gladys Dyment, administratrix of
the estate of Nettie S. Woods, to assist her in the settlement of
this estate. Nettie S. Woods was killed in an automobile acci-
dent in Buffalo, N. Y. Her estate consisted of bank deposits
amounting to $235.28 and an undetermined claim against the
driver of the fatal car.
Mr. Riley advanced $300.00 of his own money to employ an





The signature at the top marked D is the one on the authorization denied by
Gladys Dyment. Numbers 1, 2 and 3 are undisputed signatures of the writer.
The denied signature contains every quality and element that it should to have
been written by Gladys Dyment. The speed and vigor with which it was written,
combined with the details of the letter forms and peculiarities, take it out of the
possibility of being an imitation.
There are no significant differences, and the similarities are obvious, overwhelming,
and conclusive.
of the car, and this attorney succeeded in concluding a settle-
ment of the claim for $2000.00. In the meantime the bank had
issued a check to Gladys Dyment, the administratrix, for
$235.28. This check she brought to the office of Mr. Riley and
after endorsing it directed Mr. Riley to deposit it in his own
account and apply it against the advance he had made to the
Buffalo attorney. Mr. Riley properly advised the administra-
trix that this could not legally be done without her written
authorization. In accordance 'with this suggestion the authori-
zation was prepared, and Gladys Dyment signed it, "Estate of
Nettie S. Woods, Gladys Dyment, admr." This was on January
11, 1935.




The authorization was signed, "Estate of Nettie S. Woods, Gladys Dyment, admr."
Line D is a portion of this signing; lines I and 2 are undisputed writings by Gladys
Dyment.
This illustrates in the same forceful way that Gladys Dyment wrote all of the
denied matter on the authorization.
ney that Mr. Riley had without authority taken funds from
the estate, and thereupon a criminal charge of grand larceny
was brought against him.
At the trial Mr. Riley's main defense was the written authori-
zation given him by the administratrix, Gladys Dyment. To his
great surprise, however, she denied having signed it. The de-
fense then submitted the problem to a handwriting expert who
testified that the signature, Gladys Dyment, on the authorization
was genuine and that it had been written by her. In order
to offset this testimony the assistant district attorney who was
trying the case submitted the matter to his handwriting expert,
Elbridge W. Stein, of New York, who reported to him that
the complaining witness, Gladys Dyment, was not truthful
about having signed the authorization and that she had un-
questionably signed it. (See illustrations A and B.) The
assistant district attorney not only did not call Mr. Stein as
a witness for the People but asked him to leave the examination
room by a side door so that the persons in the court room
would not know that he had examined the disputed signature
for the prosecution.
Mr. Riley was convicted and sentenced to from 18 months to
5 years in Sing Sing. Sentence was suspended upon full restitu-
tion being made, but this criminal conviction led to automatic
disbarment from the legal profession. An appeal was taken,
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but it was never perfected because the expense of the trial had
entirely depleted Mr. Riley's funds. These happenings occurred
in June 1936, and for twelve long years, the best years of his
life, Mr. Riley labored under the paralyzing stigma of a crimi-
nal conviction and disbarment as a lawyer.
Heartened by the results in the Campbell case in New York
in which a man had been unjustly convicted and after a period
of years the conviction had been vacated, Mr. Riley put forth
every effort to have his case reconsidered by the proper tribunal.
State Senator Louis B. Heller, an able lawyer, unselfishly took
Mr. Riley's case without fee and successfully brought it before
Kings County Judge, Hon. Carmine J. Marasco, who reopened
the case and, after hearing the entire story of the trial and
conviction from the witnesses, wisely and courageously decided
that Mr. Riley had been unjustly convicted and vacated the
conviction and set aside the indictment. Justice was thus partly
done to a grievously wronged defendant after twelve bitter,
heartbreaking years.
During the hearing before Judge Marasco an assistant dis-
trict attorney who represented the Brooklyn Prosecutor's office
submitted the disputed signature problem to the handwriting
expert of the Technical Research Bureau of the New York
Police Department, and as a result of his study he testified that
the authorization signature of Gladys Dyment was genuine.
It should not be inferred, therefore, that the present Brooklyn
Prosecutor's office was in any way trying to justify the con-
viction of Mr. Riley, but rather that this office was making an
effort to establish right and justice.
Some excerpts from Judge Marasco's opinion are given here
which may be of value to a prosecutor trying a case in which
a similar or parallel set of facts may exist.
"The issue involved in this motion is whether or not the
assistant district attorney who tried the case, in bringing about
the conviction of this defendant by suppressing evidence which
would have been helpful to the defendant, practiced a fraud
which deprived the defendant of the constitutional protection
guaranteed to him under our laws.
"A prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer representing the Peo-
ple of the State of New York and presumed to act impartially in
the interest only of justice. It is as much his duty to see that
no innocent man suffers as it is to see that no guilty man goes
unpunished. If he disregards his dual duty and suppresses or
omits to present evidence which may be helpful to the jury in
determining a true and just verdict, especially if such sup-
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pressed evidence could be helpful to a defendant, he ceases to
properly represent the public interest. It is the duty of a
prosecutor to present to the trial jury all of the material evi-
dence of which he may become possessed, in order that the jury
may properly evaluate the credibility of the witnesses called
before them to testify and more particularly to aid them in
ascertaining the truth as to a disputed fact.
"It was the duty of the assistant district attorney to offer
the testimony of Stein who was available to testify, even though
his testimony was detrimental to the State, so that the jury
would be aided in arriving at the truth of the authenticity of
the authorization. True administration and a fair trial required
the disclosure to the court and jury of Stein's opinion which was
known only to the assistant district attorney. The failure of
the prosecutor to do this deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
"The strong probability is that had Stein testified as a wit-
ness for the People, his testimony would have affected the
result. It cannot be said that Stein's testimony would have
been cumulative. Testifying as a witness called by the People,
Stein's opinion that the signature of the complainant affixed
to the authorization was genuine, would have destroyed the
probative force of complainant's denial of the authenticity of
her signature which denial undoubtedly influenced the jury in
its verdict. The authorization was a complete defense to the
indictment. The conviction in this case cannot be permitted to
stand. "'
I New York Law Journal, March 17, 1948.
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